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The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the legalization of
same-sex marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships with LGBT political participation and
activism. There has long been a debate between several groups of LGBT activists on what the
legalization of same-sex marriage will do to LGBT activism. Will achieving same-sex marriage
ultimately hinder the movement or will it open new realms of possibility for change? This study
aims to survey the arguments offered by a few prevalent sides of the same-sex marriage
debate, then provide empirical information as support for one of those claims. This study will
conduct a generalized ordinal logit of legalization and LGBT participation to offer evidence
supporting an increase or decrease in in likelihood for political participation after marriage
legalization. The results showed that living in a legalized state does not necessarily increase the
likelihood of participation in the LGBT community. Instead, education and income were
significant factors in addressing the likelihood of participation among the LGBT community.
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CHAPTER I: A THEORETICAL DEBATE ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
What Has Same-Sex Marriage Done to LGBT Activism?
There exists a long-standing debate among several sub-groups of LGBT activists on
whether the goal of same-sex marriage is an end or a starting point for LGBT activism. Some
LGBT activists believe same-sex marriage legalization should cause the public to take LGBT
identities and opinions more seriously, thus creating more opportunity and space for inclusive,
positive change in both public and private realms. Other groups of LGBT activists believe that
same-sex marriage essentially signals the end of the movement for several different reasons.
They consider marriage too exclusionary, and the fight for legalization would cause the
movement to alienate many activists and groups within the LGBT community. They also believe
that same-sex marriage campaigns use up so much money for advocacy, and there leaves no
more monetary room for other campaigns and issues for the LGBT community. Does achieving
same-sex marriage ultimately end the movement or will it open new realms of possibility for
change? This study aims to survey several theoretical arguments considering the same-sex
marriage debate and to examine what effect the legalization of marriage might have on LGBT
activism. Chapter I will survey the theoretical arguments for and against same-sex marriage,
and Chapter II will be a quantitative study aiming to provide empirical support for any elements
of the arguments being addressed.
How Marriage Became a Main Goal

Several authors have examined how and why same-sex marriage suddenly became a
high salient goal in the 1990s (Egan, 2011; Warner, 1999; Taylor, 2009; Stewart, 2003;
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Chauncey, 2009; Pierceson, 2014). The marriage battle used to be deemed unachievable before
the 1990s, but once people started winning unexpected rights through small civil courts, it
emerged as a main issue. How did marriage rights become so important to so many within the
LGBT community, especially given the gay liberation movements in the 1970s worked closely
with feminist movements to combat marriage as an institution altogether?
Pierceson (2014) describes how an official lesbian and gay movement began in the
1950s after WWII. At the time, “marriage was the last thing on the minds of these advocates”
(p.25). An actual gay and lesbian movement did not take shape in the public sphere until the
Stonewall Riots in 1969. Stewart (2003) supports this claim that the birth of gay liberation is
often associated with the Stonewall Riots in 1969 in New York City. New York City police raided
the Stonewall Inn and the inhabitants violently resisted them. The people defending the
Stonewall Inn mostly consisted of then self-identified transvestites, butch lesbians, and gay
teens. Following soon after was the first Gay Pride parade in 1970. Stonewall launched a new
visibility of LGBT identities altogether.
Same-sex couples began to apply for marriage licenses in the 1970s, but they were
denied in Minnesota, Kentucky, and Washington. Although these failures produced some
disappointment, they also provided more motivation for LGBT marriage activists to pursue
same-sex marriage legislation. In 1975, the Dixon Bill was proposed in Washington D.C.
regarding “no fault divorce”. Because all the language in the bill was gender-neutral, same-sex
couples began to use it to fight for marriage rights (Pierceson, 2014). The right to a no-fault
divorce gave proof that marriage is a pursuit of happiness rather than an obligation. No-fault
divorce meant that people could get married and divorced without many consequences. This
2

proves that Americans marry for happiness and self-fulfillment, and then can divorce without
fault. Americans no longer needed to provide justification for divorce. Pierceson argues that the
Dixon Bill triggered a long-lasting fight for marriage rights. Gay and lesbian couples are moving
forward with their activism, and the Equal Rights Amendment, which Congress passed in 1972,
gave them inspiration to seek equal protection and rights.
Chauncey (2009) believed there were three main developments, along with other
intervening factors mentioned by Stewart, that caused the LGBT community to focus on
marriage as a main goal for the movement. The three developments from the 1970s to 1990s
that caused interest in marriage were the dramatic growth in acceptance of gays and lesbians,
the devastating impact of AIDS, and the lesbian baby boom. Chauncey suspects that the
Stonewall Riots had much to do with LGBT people coming into the public eye. Being in the
public eye began to ensure greater tolerance and acceptance for LGBT relationships. The
devastating impact of AIDS on the LGBT community also made couples want to have their
relationships legally recognized for rights. Many people could not visit their partners in the
hospital when they were sick because they were not considered family. Many individuals also
lost their belongings and property if their partners died because they were not married. There
was a lot at stake when the AIDS crisis struck the LGBT community, so the people tried their
hardest to have their relationships validated by the state. The epidemic raised the question of
“who counted as family” (p. 99).
When Chauncey refers to the lesbian baby boom, he means that lesbians were losing
custody rights of their children from previous heterosexual relationships because same-sex
relationships were deemed as unfit for parenting. Lesbians ran a better chance of keeping their
3

children from previous relationships if they lived with their partners and mimicked heterosexual
relationships (Chauncey, 2009). This made many lesbian women want to pursue marriage
licenses because then they would be able to keep their children. Therefore, widespread public
tolerance, the AIDS epidemic, and child custody rights for lesbians sparked not just an interest,
but a need for marriage rights in the LGBT community.
Pierceson (2014) describes how there were marriage victories in the 1990s in Hawaii,
Alaska, Vermont, and Massachusetts. Although Hawaii repealed several marriage licenses
between same-sex couples with a referendum in the late 1990s after they were initially
approved, the same-sex weddings triggered even more activism for marriage.
Rimmerman (2014) argues the Christian right and social conservatives have massive
influence on the direction of the LGBT movement. He contends that same-sex marriage
campaigns were triggered by a spark in anti-gay ballot initiatives within religious right groups.
Conservative groups and legislators proposed bills to ban same-sex marriage while
simultaneously pressuring Democrat legislators to vote against same-sex marriage to keep their
heterosexual voters’ support. As Rimmerman states, “just as the far right had hoped, many
otherwise liberal legislators voted for bills and infuriated gay and lesbian voters” (p. 105). Gay
and lesbian groups spent most of their time persuading legislators to vote against anti-gay
ballot initiatives, thus devoting most of their time and resources to marriage.
One of the most significant anti-gay pieces of legislation to come forward during the
marriage battle was the Defense of Marriage Act, otherwise known at DOMA. Per Dolan (2013),
DOMA part of the social conservative backlash to a growing gay and lesbian movement, and the
bill was designed to, “paint gays and lesbians as deviants” (p. 114). Social conservatives wanted
4

to protect a traditional marriage and family dynamic, and the LGBT community would
essentially destroy those traditional values. Many Republicans and Democrats alike embraced
DOMA.
Vermont was the first official victory in making same-sex civil unions an actual law, and
Massachusetts officially became the first same-sex marriage state in 2003. With these
significant victories, same-sex marriage became a high priority issue in the United States.
Stewart (2003) and Chauncey (2009) emphasize how same-sex marriage achieved salience
through the possibility that Hawaii and Vermont were going to permit marriage licenses to gay
couples in the 1990s as well. These two small court cases launched a whole campaign for
marriage (Stewart, 2003; Chauncey, 2009).
After the cases in Hawaii and Vermont were won, San Francisco kicked off more
marriage licenses and several other cities followed in the late 1990s (Chauncey, 2009). States
fought for years over marriage legalization both statewide through civil courts and nationwide
through direct legislation (Chauncey, 2009). Now as of June 26th, 2015, after the Supreme Court
ruled bans on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional, same-sex marriage was nationally
legalized. LGBT couples are continuing to get married at rapid rates (USCB, 2015).
Although same-sex marriage has been nationally legalized, the LGBT community is still
actively fighting for equal rights in several other social institutions (Human Rights Campaign,
2015). Large LGBT organizations are fighting for adoption rights, employment/workplace safety,
and freedom of expression on behalf of the LGBT community. Same-sex marriage legalization
was not the end of oppression for the LGBT community, and many people are still fighting for
equality.
5

Marriage as an Opening for the LGBT Movement
This section aims to survey the arguments in favor of same-sex marriage legislation.
Many theorists argued that achieving same-sex marriage would ultimately cause society to
consider LGBT individuals a part of mainstream society, thus taking their visibility in association
more seriously. (Josephson, 2005; Bernstein, 2015; Rauch, 2004). Other theorists speculated
that the LGBT community will be more accepted once they assimilate into heterosexual cultural
practices (Sullivan, 2004). Lastly, few studies suggest that social movements could have an
influence on future activism. Assessing these arguments in favor of same-sex marriage
legislation could potentially help produce evidence and support for my study.

Josephson (2005) describes how some conservative LGBT activists believed same-sex
marriage is the only reasonable goal for LGBT movements. Josephson states that these activists
believe, “access to marriage will create a more mature gay culture, since…marriage leads to a
fulfilled adult life that connects love, sex, and responsibility” (p. 272). By connecting love, sex,
and responsibility, society would, hypothetically, begin to see LGBT people as more relatable
and trustworthy. These conservative LGBT activists typically advocated for same-sex marriage
because, “marriage would rein in sexual promiscuity, which would in turn make gays and
lesbians better citizens” (p. 136). The goal was to assimilate and these activists believed,
“allowing same-sex marriage would encourage traditional familial values among gay couples”
(p. 136).
Much like Josephson, Bernstein (2015) believes that, “achieving same-sex marriage will
perhaps open up even more space to expand the LGBT political agenda in pursuit of broad
6

intersectional goals of structural change, social justice, and the common good” (p. 334). Per
Bernstein, marriage has a variety of normalizing and non-normalizing effects. It is normalizing in
the sense that LGBT couples can participate in the same institution as do heterosexual couples.
The normalizing effect will create a widespread acceptance of LGBT couples, making their issues
more valid than they were before since they will be considered part of a community; something
they may have not experienced before. If society can relate to LGBT couples, then they are
more likely to be open to listening to their problems, thus being open to more change in the
LGBT community (Bernstein, 2015). Jonathon Rauch agrees that marriage will open, “a new
level of social acceptance” (p. 55). It is non-normalizing in the sense that it opens the door for
policies recognizing alternative family forms in addition to heterosexual relationships. Policy
changes to include alternative family forms brings more consideration and acceptance of LGBT
identities.
Rauch (2004), a strong advocate for marriage equality, supposes that, “many
homosexuals glorified the underworld as their salvation and mistook it for home” (p. 63). Rauch
believes that queer culture is the perceived “underworld” and people settled there for a
marginalized lifestyle when they thought that marriage was an unreachable goal. Rauch thinks
those people are now too comfortable with their marginalized lifestyles so they do not wish to
marry. Essentially, he is arguing that radical activists who oppose marriage are willingly
embracing their own oppression, thus creating a marginalized lifestyle altogether. These
authors imagined same-sex marriage would lead mainstream society to treat LGBT individuals
with acceptance. The literature following addresses the impact of social movements on future
activism.
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Other pieces of literature have measured the impact of same-sex marriage campaigns
on future activism. Taylor (2009) found, “powerful evidence that culture can be consequential
not only internally, with implications for participant solidarity and identity, but for political
change and further action as well” (p. 865). When Taylor refers to culture, she means that
groups of people with the same morals and values can create social change, especially in times
of injustice. Their movement to movement study suggests that, “activism around one campaign
affects participation in subsequent movements” (p. 868). The activism inside one’s culture can
create change and impact activism in the future. This offers evidence for my study on the basis
that same-sex marriage legislation could have an impact on future LGBT movements to come.
Meyer and Whittier (1994) also mention a spill-over effect from the women’s
movement to several different peace movements during the civil rights era. They believe that
the women’s movement influenced future peace movements in the USA (1994). Current social
movements have the potential to influence future activism within social movements.
Montgomery (2015) cites an example from Massachusetts, the first state to achieve full
marriage equality. Even after marriage equality, activists continued to fight for more rights in
other discriminatory realms. Montgomery states on behalf of Executive Director Kara Coredini,
“the organization has leveraged its activist base and lobbying and electoral presence to advance
priorities shared with its partner groups, working successfully for a trans-inclusive
nondiscrimination bill, a commission on LGBT aging, and LGBT representatives on the first
statewide commission on homeless youth” (p. 50).
Some arguments on same-sex marriage and activism suggest that same-sex weddings,
protests, and the marriage equality movement could positively influence future movements for
8

LGBT rights. Other arguments favored same-sex marriage legislation because it is assimilating,
which in turn creates acceptance of the LGBT community. Although this literature offers
compelling arguments in favor of same-sex marriage, there are several disagreeing theorists on
this subject, and they believe same-sex marriage will hinder the LGBT community.
Marriage as a Hindrance to the LGBT Movement
Radical activists generally oppose marriage for two reasons. First, they argue that the
exclusionary nature of marriage will cause the movement to lose allies and supporters. Second,
they argue marriage activism has taken up so much money that other forms of activism are no
longer possible. These arguments could potentially provide support for my study on same-sex
marriage and LGBT activism.
Several theorists believe that the same-sex marriage goal is exclusionary because it only
ends up benefitting a few privileged people instead of most of the LGBT community. By only
benefitting a small number within the LGBT community, the fight for marriage rights might
cause the LGBT movement to lose support from many people. In turn, this may discourage
many LGBT individuals from identifying with the movement if they do not feel included in LGBT
politics (Warner, 1999, Josephson, 2005; Taylor, 2009; Farrow, 2004; Taylor J., 2014; DeFillippis,
2016). Losing people within the movement will only make it weaker, thus hindering the
movement altogether.
Michael Warner (1999) asserts that marriage sanctifies some at the expense of others.
This means that marriage slaps on a label of legitimacy for couples and whoever does not have
that label is less worthy. Josephson (2005) supports this argument by stating, “same-sex
marriage…would provide benefits to more privileged members of the LGBT community, but
9

would disenfranchise others” (p. 273). Many same-sex couples that get married are often
middle/upper class white men, forgetting the struggles that other LGBT individuals may endure
besides getting married. Josephson believes, “many in the queer community would be further
marginalized by the normalizing effects that marriage may bring to those in the community
who are most like heterosexual married couples” (p. 274). If most of the people within the LGBT
movement will not benefit from marriage equality, then they would be less inclined to support
it. Bornstein (2010) asserts that marriage continues this privilege among white, middle class gay
and lesbian couples while simultaneously inhibiting health care for many LGBT individuals that
do not want to or cannot get married. Marriage carries many benefits, including tax breaks and
more opportunities for better health coverage plans. There are many single LGBT individuals
that deserve healthcare but cannot get it unless they are married. Kate Bernstein, in her letter
LGBT leaders on marriage equality, protests that, “gay marriage might give some married gay
people access to health care, tax breaks, and immigration rights. But shouldn’t our community
be fighting for us all to have access to health care, whatever our ‘marital status’?” (p. 47).
DeFillippis (2016) also believes that the movement is losing allies due to its lack of
attention on LGBT poverty as a prominent social issue. Focusing on marriage equality only
benefits a small percentage of the LGBT community while others are left to deal with
homelessness, sickness, and instability due to their lack of rights. Those who do not feel
represented will not feel inclined to support the movement for marriage equality, thus losing
widespread support for the community.
Farrow (2004) also assesses the issue that marriage equality is essentially anti-black in
the LGBT movement. He observes that, “Atlanta LGBT citizens that opposed gay marriages were
10

black people” (p. 33). According to Farrow, black people are not represented because they are
denied certain rights for either not wanting to get married or being unable to find a partner fit
for long term romantic love and financial security. Everyone deserves the rights that come with
marriage, but many people in the LGBT community cannot get access to those rights as single
individuals, thus they do not wish to participate in the LGBT movement for marriage equality.
Many people believe they deserve those rights anyway, and they should not have to get
married to receive them. Farrow concludes with a powerful statement against the movement
saying, “Americans are suffering and dying because they can’t get decent health care, and gays
want weddings” (p. 75).
Several radical LGBT activists also criticize how marriage equality campaigns have
sucked up so many resources and money that other campaigns and social services were unable
to keep providing aid to the LGBT community (Conrad, 2015; Swan, 1997).
Conrad (2009) describes how, “the gay marriage movement has been sucking up
resources like a massive sponge” (p. 60). It has been taking up so many resources that it has
caused other LGBT social service groups and institutes to shut down because they do not get
the same amount of funding that the marriage campaigns do, thus creating bitter attitudes
among those that felt the LGBT community needed more help than just marriage equality.
Some marriage campaigns have spent, “close to $6 million over the duration of the campaign”
(p. 61). Radical activists believe that money could have been spent on social services for LGBT
people in poverty or without health care. Instead, the movement was campaigning for the right
to marry for privileged individuals.
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Swan (1997) describes how LGBT groups in states with legalized same-sex marriage have
found all their funding diminished. When state governments see that marriage equality has
been achieved, they reduce funding for several social services that aid LGBT communities
because same-sex marriage legalization is perceived as the final fight for equal rights. However,
there are still several issues to be addressed like racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination
within the movement. Alcohol and drug addiction are serious problems in the LGBT community,
and now the movement does not receive resources for those problems since marriage has been
achieved (Swan, 1997). This decreased funding leaves people bitter about the movement,
possibly causing them to abandon it altogether. Again, by sucking up all the funding for
marriage equality, the LGBT movement is losing close allies and other services for LGBT people
in need. If marriage campaigns exclude large groups of individuals within the movement and it
uses up all monetary resources, then the movement may become divisive and unable to agree
on strategies for activism.

This theoretical debate on whether same-sex marriage legalization will have a positive
or negative impact on the LGBT community poses many questions for LGBT activism altogether.
Same-sex marriage legalization could either impact future LGBT movements or it could
potentially divide the movement altogether, capturing the decline of LGBT communities. It is
immensely important to provide evidence in support for any of the arguments in the literature
previously stated, and doing so could aid the LGBT community in their plans for future activism.
My intent is to focus on a small part of this argument: political participation and voter turnout
in the LGBT community with and without legalization of same-sex marriage, civil unions, and
12

domestic partnerships in 2010. I plan to conduct a quantitative study on same-sex marriage
legalization and LGBT political participation. My results have the capacity to offer support for
those in favor of same-sex marriage activism or those who are not.
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CHAPTER II: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LEGALIZATION AND LGBT
ACTIVISM
Given the theoretical debate above on same-sex marriage, I aim to assess the
relationship between same-sex marriage legalization in 2010 and LGBT political participation. I
want to provide evidence to support any part of the theoretical arguments regarding same-sex
marriage stated above. If the LGBT community participates more in legalized states than in nonlegalized states, then there may be evidence in favor of same-sex marriage legislation. If
participation decreases with same-sex marriage legalization, then it could offer support for an
argument against marriage.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between same-sex marriage
legalization and LGBT political participation. As of 2010, 14 states had legalized same-sex
marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnerships, so it is beneficial to compare how legalized and
un-legalized states differ in participation rates among the LGBT community. My study will use
Social Movement Spillover as a theoretical framework for my hypothesis.
Several studies have examined the spillover effects of social movements on one another
(Meyer & Whittier, 1994; Sharon, 2014; Taylor, 2009). Social movements can either influence
co-existing movements based on shared community goals, or they can influence future activism
through policy change and solidarity in victory. Social movement spillover, as defined by Meyer
and Whittier (1994), states that spillover, “considers the effects of social movements on each
other” (p. 868). Meyer and Whittier continue shaping social movement spillover with their
study on how the women’s liberation movements during the civil rights era highly influenced
the peace movements during and after women’s movements. In their findings, they conclude,
14

“Social movements are not distinct and self-contained; rather, they grow from and give birth to
other movements, work in coalition with other movements, and influence each other indirectly
through their effects on the larger cultural and political environment” (p. 277). They also found
that, “the effects of one movement have gone beyond its expressively articulated goals to
shape the larger social movement sector” (p. 293). A study done by Taylor (2009) concurs with
Meyer and Whittier and states that, “activism around one campaign affects participation in
subsequent movements” (p. 865).
Social movement spillover can happen for a variety of reasons. It could be that many
liberal movements often share the same objectives, so they end up influencing one another on
their tactics and goals within their own movements. Social movements are then no longer
mutually exclusive (Meyer & Whittier, 1994). Social movements also can personally affect
individuals and their personal goals. Many people that participate in social movements often
participate in future or co-existing movements based on their developed values and morals
from being an activist (Meyer & Whittier, 1994). The last explanation for social movement
spillover is the possibility of political opportunity after policy change. Meyer and Whittier
(1994) found in their study that the women’s movement shifted assumptions on gender,
officially making way for more women to participate in the political realm. More women in the
political realm meant that they had more power over social change. Many of these women also
supported the peace movement, so by achieving victories in the women’s movement, the
peace movement was also able to mobilize based on shared values and new opportunities for
policy transformation. Sharon (2014) supports this theory in stating, “one social movement
precedes, and is causally related to, the later one” (p. 69).
15

Same-sex marriage is a big social movement, and it is bound to have spill over into other
forms of activism for LGBT individuals, especially if same-sex marriage rights are achieved. First,
it is logical to predict that same-sex marriage activism has visibility in many other social
movements other than their own. Several other co-existing movements could hold the same
values and goals as the same-sex marriage movement. With that, LGBT activism would be
visible in many other social justice settings, creating more widespread support for several social
movements. This could potentially influence political participation in the LGBT community
because many social movement goals overlap. It could also be that the same-sex marriage
movement personally affected people within it. Many participants could have joined several
other social justice groups considering being an activist, or they plan to continue their activism
once same-sex marriage is achieved. Lastly, a big political victory on same-sex marriage could
potentially motivate people to participate more in politics. Several other social movements may
be able to mobilize with same-sex marriage legalization because of their overlapping goals for
equality. Most importantly, achieving same-sex marriage may trigger higher likelihood for
political participation within the LGBT community if the movement generates social movement
spillover.
Social Movement Spillover is being used to predict the outcome of my quantitative
study. Therefore, legalization of same-sex marriage, domestic partnerships, and civil unions
could increase the likelihood of political participation among the LGBT community.
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Hypothesis
The different sides of the marriage argument offer compelling arguments for what
effects marriage equality might have on the LGBT community. I am aiming to assess the
relationship between legalization and political participation among the LGBT community. I
conducted a quantitative study with results that should shed light on the effect same-sex
marriage could have on LGBT political participation.
My hypothesis for this study is: Legalization of same sex marriage, civil unions, and domestic
partnerships increases the likelihood of LGBT political participation and voter turnout. I
formulated my hypothesis based on literature supporting Social Movement Spillover, as
described previously. The independent variable of interest is the legalization status of marriage,
civil unions, and domestic partnerships in a state as of 2010. The two dependent variables are
LGBT political participation and LGBT voter turnout.1 I expect a positive relationship between
legalization and LGBT participation and voter turnout, meaning legalization could have an
impact on participation and voting rates among the LGBT community.

1

Voter turnout was not blended in with political participation because voter turnout alone could possibly be
explained by legalization. Voting is the number one form of political participation in which people take part.
Incorporating voter turnout within political participation may skew results to make it look like LGBT individuals
attend rallies and campaign activities etc. more than they do. Therefore, voter turnout should be a dependent
variable by itself.
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Method
Sample
Data for this study is from the Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010), a national survey of
LGBT individuals that examines their sociopolitical experiences around several themes such as
identity, religion, health, and civic/community engagement. The sample consists of
approximately 5,000 respondents through a convenience sample based on census data. There
are 1,782 individual cases in legalized states. This data is highly relevant to what I am studying
because some states had legalized same-sex marriage and some did not as of 2010. Since the
data is strictly LGBT respondents, I can accurately assess how legalization of same-sex marriage
influenced LGBT participation.
Variables & Measures
Measurement for the independent variable of interest is the official legalization status
of same sex marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships in 2010. Each state was split up
into individual categories depending on if they were legalized, had civil unions/domestic
partnerships, or not legalized at all. States with full legalization were coded as 2, civil
unions/domestic partnerships as 1, and those without legalization were coded as 0 (See Table
A2).
Political participation, the dependent variable, was measured by a grouping of
questions like how often LGBT individuals have participated in political events, how often they
participated in social and cultural events, and how often they have donated to political
organizations. Political events were organized events such as rallies, marches, and other public
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statements. Social events consisted of clubs, movies, support groups, and restaurants. Donating
means donating to specifically LGBT organizations. All answers were coded as follows:

Table 1.1: Descriptive Coding for Variables
Variable

M

SD

Min

Max

Legalization Status

.404

.574

0

2

Pride Festivals

2.096

.822

1

3

Political Events

1.783

.640

1

3

Social Events

2.285

.661

1

3

Donating

2.014

.683

1

3

Voting

.819

.385

0

3

Income

1.842

.750

1

3

Political Affiliation

1.339

.619

1

3

Religion

.634

.482

0

1

Education

.560

.496

0

1
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Table 1.2: Distribution of Political Participation

Total:

POL events

SOC events

Donate

Never

1622 (32.7%)

560 (11.3%)

1085 (21.9%)

Sometimes

2,620 (52.9%)

2,314 (46.8%)

2,475 (51.8%)

Often

578 (11.7%)

1,927 (38.9%)

1,154 (23.3%)

Missing

133 (2.7%)

152 (3.1%)

149 (3%)

4,953 (100%)

4,449 (100%)

4,863 (100%)

Table 1.3: Distribution of Voter Turnout
Voter Turnout
Voted

3830 (77.3%)

Did Not Vote

847 (17.1%)

Missing

847 (17.1%)

Total:

5,524
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Voter turnout is measured in terms of whether an LGBT person voted (1) in the 2008
presidential election or not (0)2.
Other independent variables are income, ideology, religion, and education. I chose
these explanatory variables based on past studies on political participation and voter turnout.
For example, Wolfinger finds, “college graduates vote more than high school graduates; white
collar workers vote more than blue collar workers; and the rich vote more than the poor”
(Wolfinger, 1980). It is necessary to study these demographic variables alongside my
independent variable of interest to avoid any spurious relationships.
Receiving a bachelor’s degree or higher counts as graduating college. Political beliefs
and practicing a religion were used specifically for this study because of the social
circumstances and trends within LGBT communities. Many LGBT individuals identify with liberal
ideologies, and many are non-religious (Social Justice Sexuality Project, 2010). It is useful to see
how political ideologies and religiosity affect LGBT political participation. Income was split into
three separate variables labeled high income, middle income, and low income3. Each variable
was treated as a dummy variable so comparisons can be made between income categories for
participation and voter turnout. Political ideology was re-coded as liberal, moderate, and
conservative. Religiosity and college are coded as dummy variables. Practicing a religion and
having a college degree are coded as 1, with all other categories being 0.

2

Voter turnout statistics are self-reported from the survey. People may be inclined to be dishonest about their
voting habits to make it seem like they participate more than they do.
3 See appendix for measurements and coding of all variables.

21

Analysis
There are 14 states as of 2010 with legalized same-sex marriage, civil unions, and
domestic partnerships. A generalized ordinal logit model4 was used for attendance to political
events, social events, pride festivals, and money donation to analyze results since the answer
categories are ranked. 5 A binary logit model was used for voter turnout since the dependent
variable has only two outcomes.

Table 1.4: Legalization Status in States
State

Legalization Status

Number of Individual Cases

Connecticut

Marriage

15

Washington DC

Marriage

118

Iowa

Marriage

7

Massachusetts

Marriage

75

New Hampshire

Marriage

2

Vermont

Marriage

2

California

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

800

Hawaii

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

262

Maine

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

3

Nevada

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

28

New Jersey

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

100

Oregon

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

71

Washington

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

36

Wisconsin

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

263
Total: 1,782 cases

4

The categories “never” and “sometimes” in the ordinal logit are being compared to a base category of those
whom participate “often”

5

Select variables violated the Parallel Regression Assumption, so a generalized ordered logit is a better fit for
analysis than an ordered logit.
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Results6
Political Events
The results of Table 2.1 show that being in a legalized state does not have an impact on
attending political events. They are more likely to NOT participate in political events if they live
in a legalized state. LGBT individuals with a college degree are also more likely to participate
sometimes in political events. This shows that having a college degree has an impact on the
likelihood of political participation more than does living in a legalized state.

Table 2.1: Ordinal Logit for Participation in Political Events
1(never)
Independent
Variables

Legalization Status
Income
Education
Religion
Political Affiliation

2(sometimes)

Coef.
(Std. Error)

Coef.
(Std. Error)

.230
(.072)**
.067
(.057)
.299
(.101)*

.163
(.095)
-.111
(.085)
.298
(.085)**

.001
(.056)

.103
(.069)

.292
(.059)**

-.183
(.073)*

N=1,782 P<.05* P<.01**

6 6 Select variables violated the

Parallel Regression Assumption, so a generalized ordered logit is a better fit
for analysis than an ordered logit.
6 Note: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was used to test any multicollinearity problems. All VIF scores are less
than 5. Thus, there is no multicollinearity in this model. Refer to Appendix for VIF table.
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Table 2.2 shows participation comparisons between people in legal states with and
without a college degree. People with no college are less likely to participate often, and more
likely to participate never. This shows that income potentially plays a significant role in political
participation among the LGBT community. The results of a calculated prediction for LGBT
individuals with and without education indicate that any given person is more likely to
participate in political events if they have a bachelor’s degree versus high school. Those with a
college degree are 15% likely to participate in political events often, and those without a college
degree are only 12% likely to participate often.

Table 2.2: Prediction Profile for People with Education vs. No Education in Legalized States
No College

College

.298
.583
.119

.239
.606
.154

Never
Sometimes
Often

Social Events
Table 3.1 also indicates that living in a legalized state is not related to participation in
social events. Much like Table 2, people with a college degree are more likely to participate
sometimes in social events. The unique finding here is that LGBT individuals with more liberal
political beliefs are more likely to participate in social events, unlike political events.
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Table 3.1: Ordinal Logit for Participation in Social Events
1(never)
Independent
Variables

2(sometimes)

Coef.
(Std. Error)

Coef.
(Std. Error)

.041
(.121)
.100
(.069)
.493
(.096)**
-.127
(.105)

-.035
(.083)
.033
(.034)
.266
(.056)**
.044
(.065)

.414
(.092)**

.222
(.053)**

Legalization Status
Income
Education
Religion
Political Affiliation

N=1,782 P<.05* P<.01**

Since college and political belief were both significant in the ordinal logit, it was useful
to run a prediction assessment comparing liberal people with and without a college degree.
Again, any given LGBT individual is more likely to participate in social events often if they have a
college degree. Liberal LGBT individuals with a college degree are 45% likely to participate in
social events, and those without a college degree are only 37% likely to participate.

Table 3.2: Prediction Profile for Liberal People with Education vs. No Education
No College

College

Never

.116

.087

Sometimes

.508
.376

.460
.452

Often
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Donating
The only significant variable for donating money to LGBT organizations was income. This
was expected since people with higher incomes typically have more money to spend on things
other than vital expenses. Once again, living in a legalized state does not increase the
likelihood to donate to LGBT organizations.

Table 4.1: Ordinal Logit for Donating to LGBT Organizations
1(never)

2(sometimes)

Coef.
(Std. Error)

Coef.
(Std. Error)

.016
(.075)
.449
(.061)**
.126
(.132)

.112
(.080)
.272
(.043)**
-.082
(.081)

Religion

.046
(.072)

.287
(.078)**

Political Affiliation

.147
(.076)

-.097
(.108)

Independent
Variables

Legalization Status
Income
Education

N=1,782 P<.05* P<.01**

Income was a highly significant variable for donating money to LGBT organizations, so I
ran prediction assessments comparing low income and high income non-religious voters.
People with high incomes are much more likely to donate to LGBT organizations often than
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those with low incomes. This makes logical sense since people with higher incomes typically
have more freedom with their expenses, thus donating to their political causes more often.

Table 4.2: Prediction Profile for High Income vs. Low Income Non-Religious People
Low Income

High Income

.284
.551
.166

.165
.551
.285

Never
Sometimes
Often

Pride Festivals
Income and practicing a religion were both highly significant with respect to
participation in pride festivals. LGBT individuals who are practicing a religion are more likely to
participate never and sometimes in pride festivals. Those with a higher income are more likely
to participate in pride festivals sometimes.

27

Table 5.1: Ordinal Logit for Participation in Pride Festivals
1(never)
Independent
Variables
Legalization Status
Income

2(sometimes)

Coef.
(Std. Error)
-.078
(.163)
.052
(.066)

Coef.
(Std. Error)
.023
(.171)
.155
(.059)**

.012
(.055)

-.069
(.065)

.264
(.081)**

.309
(.101)**

.045
(.053)

-.004
(.040)

Education
Religion
Political Affiliation

N=1,782 P<.05* P<.01**

Income and practicing a religion were significant when tested for participation in pride
festivals. This shows that people who practice a religion are more likely to attend pride festivals
than those who do not practice a religion. Income was also significant so I ran a profile
comparing high income religious people to low income religious people. Of all people who
practice a religion, those with higher incomes are still more likely to participate often than
those with low incomes.

Table 5.2: Prediction Profile for High Income vs. Low Income Religious People
Low Income

High Income

.291
.315
.394

.248
.304
.448

Never
Sometimes
Often
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Voting
Last, Table 2.5 shows the binary logit for voter turnout among states. All variables were
significant for voter turnout except for practicing a religion and legalization status. An LGBT person
with higher income is 1.5 times more likely in odds to vote than those with lower incomes, and
someone with
a college degree is over twice as likely in odds to vote than those without a college degree. The
most peculiar finding here is that more liberal LGBT individuals are 20% less likely in odds to turn
up to vote. With that, results show that liberal LGBT individuals and LGBT people who live in a
state with legalized same-sex marriage are less likely to turn up to vote.

Table 6: Binary Logit for Voter Turnout
Independent Variables
Legalization Status
income
Education
Religion
Political Affiliation

MLE Coefficient
(Std. Error)
-.277
(.169)
.370
(.055)**
.879
(.154)**
.177
(.103)

Odds Ratio
(Percentage)
.758
(-24.2%)
1.448
(44.8%)
2.408
(140.8%)
1.194
(19.4%)

.263
(.058)**

1.301
(30.1%)

N=1,782 P<.05* P<.01**

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between same-sex marriage
legalization and LGBT political participation. As of 2010, 14 states had legalized same-sex
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marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnerships, so it was useful to compare states with
legalized same-sex marriage to those without same-sex marriage.
Previous literature predicted that legalization in the states could have an impact on
LGBT activism (Taylor, 2009; Meyer & Whittier, 1994). These expectations were supported by
Spillover Theory, which states that strong social movements have a large effect on future social
movements due to victory and solidarity. My hypothesis was that legalization of same-sex
marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships would increase LGBT political participation.
There was no indication of a positive impact on political participation among the LGBT
community once their state legalized same-sex marriage. Therefore, my hypothesis was not
supported. In fact, some LGBT individuals were less likely to participate or vote if they live in a
legalized state.
The variables that measured political participation were attending political events,
attending social events, donating money to an organization, attending pride festivals, and
voting. Living in a legalized state did not increase participation in any of these realms.
LGBT individuals that live in legalized states do not participate more in political events
than those that live in un-legalized states. Surprisingly, they are more likely to NOT participate if
they live in a legalized state. This goes against what I predicted to happen with legalization and
participation. It is possible LGBT individuals may have thought they no longer needed to
participate once their state legalized same-sex marriage, civil unions, and domestic
partnerships. The LGBT community, and mainly LGBT organizations put marriage rights as a high
priority issue on their agendas in activism. So, when same-sex marriage is legalized, LGBT
individuals may feel like they have reached true equality, thus no longer feeling the needs to
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participate in politics anymore. This potentially offers support for those in the LGBT community
that argue legalizing same-sex marriage will have negative effects on the LGBT movement.
Having a college degree most influenced the likelihood an LGBT person would
participate in political events. This is noteworthy because if education can influence the
likelihood of higher participation in political events, then it is important to assess how
education plays a role in political participation among the public.
Much like the results for political events, participating in social events and donating
money to LGBT organizations were not impacted with the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Again, having a college degree made LGBT individuals more likely to participate in social events
and more likely to donate the organizations. This could potentially have something to do with
gaining networks throughout college and thus, possessing more resources and social networks
for communication. People with higher incomes also have more freedom when it comes to
everyday expenses, thus they are more likely to spend extra money on donations to LGBT
organizations. The unique finding about social events was that individuals with more liberal
political beliefs are more likely to participate in social events, but not in political events. Liberal
LGBT people have social networks but they do not organize and attend rallies.
People with a higher income and those who practice a religion were both more likely to
participate in pride festivals. This is the opposite of what I predicted from people who practice a
religion. However, many religious LGBT individuals often care about molding their churches to
accept LGBT identities and sexualities, so that is perhaps why they attend more pride festivals.
Most variables were significant for voter turnout in the states. However, going against
my hypothesis, LGBT individuals were less likely to turn up to vote if they live in a legalized
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state. This could mean that many LGBT people do not feel the need to vote anymore if their
state has legalized same-sex marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnerships. It could also mean
that those in the LGBT movement opposing same-sex marriage no longer want to participate in
LGBT politics due to exclusion or monetary reasons like stated in the literature.
Having a higher income and possessing a college degree influenced the likelihood of
LGBT voter turnout. Voting is one of the number one forms of political participation in the
public. My results contradicted the predictions of Social Movement Spillover. Instead, lower
voter turnout rates after legalization ended up supporting a completely different side in the
theoretical debate of same-sex marriage activism. LGBT individuals in legalized states were less
likely to vote than those in states without legalization. This helps the argument that LGBT
individuals may no longer feel the need to participate if their main goal has been reached.
Therefore, LGBT individuals may stop turning up to vote since they have no single issue to work
toward anymore.
Although my hypothesis was rejected according to the results, there are still many
important findings that came from the study. Income and education are immensely important
when considering who participates in the political realm and who does not. Those with higher
educations and incomes are much more likely to participate in politics all around. It does not
necessarily matter whether they live in a legalized state or not. It would be useful for future
studies to assess a more detailed relationship between these variables and LGBT political
participation.
One limitation of this research is that the data is a bit old. Although it is highly unique, it is
from 2010. I would have better been able to assess my variables if my data were more recent.
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New data would have made my study produce more representative and generalizable outcomes
as well because then I would have been able to assess participation rates over time within
different social circumstances. My data has no other data of political participation to compare, so
my study could only assess a single moment in time. With that, I cannot assume an increase or
decrease in participation over time. I can only, in theory, measure the rates of LGBT participation
in various states in 2010, when some states had full or partial legalization and others had none.
Having my data set from 2010 as well as another wave of data from 2015 would have helped me
assess if there were an actual increase or decrease in political participation over time. I can show
correlation between my variables, but not causation. Legalization and political participation could
have been correlated, but it is not safe to conclude that legalization directly causes an increase or
decrease in political participation among the LGBT community.
Future research should examine the relationship between legalization and political
participation in a more contemporary setting, especially since the national legalization of same-sex
marriage in 2015. It would also be useful to study participation on other single issue politics
besides same-sex marriage rights in LGBT political groups. Lastly, qualitative research would help
us understand the unique experiences of LGBT individuals and their relationships with politics. A
personalized qualitative approach will give some insight on why LGBT individuals are participating
or not, and what issues are important to them.
This study provides sufficient groundwork for future studies on same-sex marriage rights
and LGBT political participation. On one hand, many radical LGBT activists may be correct when
asserting that legalization would decrease LGBT political participation. This happened with voter
turnout in the results. Although my hypothesis was not supported, findings indicated that LGBT
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individuals are more likely to participate if they have higher incomes and college degrees. Income
and education were both explanatory variables, but they had the strongest relationship with
political participation.
This tells us that since LGBT individuals with education and higher incomes are more likely
to participate, maybe there should be more social programs in education for marginalized groups
like LGBT communities. Ensuring equal opportunity for LGBT individuals may have an influence on
their education and income in the future.7 Since education is strongly correlated with political
participation, those with an education are more likely to participate. I cannot assume that once
LGBT individuals achieve higher education they will automatically participate more in the political
realm. I am just stating that the two variables are strongly related, so the chance of someone
participating is much higher if they have more education. So, the start for activism is not
necessarily legalizing same-sex marriage, but providing resources for LGBT individuals to succeed
into higher education. In turn, those better opportunities may increase political participation
altogether in the LGBT community.

7

It is important to note that political participation is not the same as voting. Voting is the most popular form of
engaging in politics, giving the illusion that people may participate more than they do. The goal is to increase
political participation, which are activities outside of just voting.
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS & LEGALIZATION VISUALS

Distributions and codes and recodes of all variables

1
2
3
4
5
6

Never
Once or twice per year
About 6 times per year
About once a month
About once a week
More than once a week

These independent variables were recoded into 3 answer categories being “never”,
“sometimes”, and “often”. The re-coded answer categories and distributions are as follows:
1
2-3
4-6

Never
Sometimes
Often

37

State Legalization Status 2010
State

Legalization Status

Number of Individual Cases

Connecticut

Marriage

15

Washington DC

Marriage

118

Iowa

Marriage

7

Massachusetts

Marriage

75

New Hampshire

Marriage

2

Vermont

Marriage

2

California

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

800

Hawaii

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

262

Maine

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

3

Nevada

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

28

New Jersey

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

100

Oregon

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

71

Washington

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

36

Wisconsin

Domestic Partnerships/Civil Unions

263
Total: 1,782 cases
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